06. War & politics.pdf

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Before the decisive assault on the Dardanelles, a lot of interesting events happened in the Mediterranean, as well as in London. Since the very onset of the Dardanelles operation, there was a feeling in the air that an amphibious operation was possible, but the plan to engage land troops had immediately encountered strong opposition by Field Marshal Herbert Horatio Kitchener, who maintained that he had not a single extra soldier. It was then that Winston Churchill started talking about an all-naval operation. Admiral John Fisher rather advocated the notion that such an operation must be conducted together by army and navy: "I warned everybody about this, but it was like talking to a wall. The Dardanelles futile, without soldiers!" he wrote.

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14. Evacuation.pdf

By the autumn of 1915, the Gallipoli front finally and irrevocably stalled, with the last battle there fought on 29 August, when the Indians and Australians managed to capture a nameless mound of little importance. Yet, casualties kept growing, although nobody expected success anymore. Moreover, the general military situation sharply worsened. The command of the Central Powers decided to eliminate one of the causes of their headache – the Serbian Front. Since Austro-Hungary proved unable to do this on her own, in addition to the Austro-Hungarian 3rd Army, the German 11th Army and the Bulgarian 1st Army were engaged in a new offensive. The German and Austro-Hungarian forces struck on 7 October, the Bulgarian army launched its offensive on 14 October, and soon the Serbian front collapsed. The Entente leadership wrestled from Greece consent for the landing of an expeditionary force in Salonica, but for that, it was still necessary to find troops; some forces could be taken out of Gallipoli. However, the British and French did not linger in Serbia and quickly retreated back to Greek territory. Field-Marshal August von Mackensen, who commanded the offensive of the Central Powers, did not dare to cross the border of formally neutral Greece, but his forces occupied most of Albania (formally neutral too), and thus a rather strange Salonica front was formed, where none of the sides was particularly eager to be active. And yet, the Entente faced a new problem.

10. Battle at sea.pdf

While heavy battles were unfolding in Gallipoli, and the Allied fleet confronted the Turkish coastal batteries in the Dardanelles, an equally fierce struggle unfolded underwater. The problem was that the road network of the Gallipoli Peninsula was in its infancy, so the naïve confidence of the British command that the landing troops would march unmolested from Cape Helles all the way to Kilitbahir is surprising. Even if there had been no Ottoman troops on the peninsula, such a march would have turned into a daunting task, and breaking through the fortifications would have become an unsolvable task. Gallipoli is not about the flat plains of northern France, criss-crossed by comfortable roads and railways; Gallipoli is about dusty valleys, rocky ridges, and narrow paths for roads. By the beginning of the Allied landings, the Turks had transported five infantry divisions to the peninsula, but they used sea routes for that. And their supplies were also brought in by sea. Cargoes were delivered to the towns of Canakkale, Gelibolu, Bandirma, and Mudanya, where there were at least some berths, and from there supplies and reinforcements were sent to the front, since the distances there were pretty small. Due to that, the war on sea communications in the Sea of Marmara and the Dardanelles gained special importance.

09. Battle on the bridgeheads.pdf

The landing on the Gallipoli Peninsula on 25 April 1915 failed miserably; the task was not accomplished, the troops were stuck on bridgeheads, and on the V and U Beaches, the situation bordered with a complete disaster. Oddly enough, what saved the British, in general, was the correct Turkish strategy - to keep the bulk of the troops away from the coast, incorrectly implemented due to the lack of forces. There was no way that just and only the 9th Division could control the coast of half of the Gallipoli Peninsula. But if in the most probable landing sites in the area of Cape Helles, positions were held not by detached platoons, but at least by companies, not to mention battalions, they would certainly have drowned the landing troops in blood. The main reason for this, as it clearly transpires from facts and documents, was the incompetence of the British command at all levels, from the corps commander, General Sir Ian Hamilton, down to the battalion commanders. Personal courage did not compensate for those shortcomings. Yes, of the three brigade commanders of the 29th Division, one was killed, and the other two were wounded, but the soldiers did not get better from this. A general must command, not run ahead of the ranks, wielding his sword.

12. Stalemate.pdf

After the Second Battle of Krithia, the Allies ran out of steam, and could not take any active action for some time. In particular, on 11 May 1915, General Sir Ian Hamilton was forced to withdraw from the frontline the 29th Division, which lost 11,000 soldiers and 400 officers in fights, and replace it with the 42nd Division. However, Lieutnant-General Aylmer Hunter-Weston, who by that time had earned the nickname “Butcher of Helles”, not only was not removed, but on 24 May, Hamilton placed him in command of the newly created VIII Corps, consisting of the 29th, 42nd, and 52nd Divisions, the Royal Naval Division, and the 29th Indian Infantry Brigade. In general, the Allies at that time had to occupy themselves with the transportation of reinforcements and the refitting of their positions. The Australian 1st Light Horse Brigade arrived at Anzac Cove, and the Naval Division battalions returned to Cape Helles. The Turks also suffered losses during the fighting and calmed down for a while, although not for long. But troubles continued to haunt the Allies: on 15 May, a Turkish sniper mortally wounded the commander of the 1st Australian division, Major General Sir William Throsby Bridges.

11. Battle in the air.pdf

The naval war in the Dardanelles and the Sea of Marmara was rapidly acquiring new features, perhaps even faster than in the main naval theatre in the North Sea. Here, the Allies actively used a new weapon – the submarines, but almost simultaneously with them, the war moved into another dimension – into the air.

08. Blood on the beaches.pdf

After the debacle on 18 March 1915, the British command decided to try to capture the Black Sea straits from the land. The Admiralty still believed that the ground forces should be brought into action only after the fleet broke through to the Sea of Marmara, but a different point of view prevailed. What the British generals were counting on is hard to say. The war on the Western front has since long assumed a positional character. Why did they assume that they would be able to march across the Dardanelles by a forced march, remains a mystery. After all, it was no secret that the mountainous wilderness of the Gallipoli Peninsula did not in the least resemble the well-maintained roads of Western Europe. The Turks had long concentrated significant forces on the peninsula, and there was absolutely no chance of a swift offensive. And yet the fateful decision was made.

07. The Dardanelles' reveille.pdf

Admiral de Robeck's plan was simple: He intended to reduce the forts and batteries of the Narrows with artillery fire from the extreme distances, after which his ships would steam up the straits, while silencing the howitzer batteries covering the minefields. With the Turkish artillery eliminated, trawlers would clear the passage about half a mile wide to open the way to the battleships, which would finish the Narrows defences at the blank point. And next day they efforts would be crowned with a triumphant entry into the Sea of Marmara. In essence, it would be the repetition of the operation to reduce the forts at the entrance to the Dardanelles.

03. Crisis in the Straits.pdf

As strange as it may seem, the escape of Goeben and Breslau to the Dardanelles brought great relief to the British Admiralty. As if a heavy stone fell from their heart: Nothing menaced any more their control of the Mediterranean Sea, and the French shipping could launch unmolested transfer of the troops from North Africa to the Western front. Their Lordships had painted a glamorous picture of cowardly escape, and consequent inglorious internment of the German Mediterranean Squadron.

05. Ships against forts.pdf

On 19 February 1915 salvoes from the battleship "Cornwallis" opened the ill-fated Dardanelles operation. It may be considered a bad omen, but it was the surrender of General Charles Cornwallis that put the end to the American War of Independence, although the battleship was named after his brother, Admiral Sir William Cornwallis. Nevertheless, there was something sinister in the air. After all, it was exactly on the same day that Admiral Sir John Duckworth started his Dardanelles campaign in 1807. At the spearhead of the attack were engaged battleships "Suffren" (Rear-Admiral Émile Guépratte's flagship), "Bouvet", "Triumph", "Albion", and "Cornwallis" (Admiral Sir Sackville Carden's flagship), as well as the battle cruiser "Inflexible". Supporting them were the battleship "Gaulois" and the protected cruiser "Amethyst". Battleship "Vengeance" (Rear-Admiral Sir John de Robeck) was kept in reserve. Arrival of the battleships "Queen Elizabeth" and "Agamemnon" was expected daily.

06. War & politics.pdf

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